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ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, BRANCH
BANKS, AND POTENTIAL ABUSE OF PRIVACY
I. Introduction
Because increasing numbers of checks are being written an-
nually,' banks are looking to computers as a means of alleviating
their paperwork problems. One use of compters in this context
has been the development of electronic fund transfer EFT systems,
which, banks hope, will save them from drowning in a sea of paper-
work.2 EFT systems allow customers to make deposits and withdraw
money from their accounts, pay bills, obtain loans to a pre-arranged
credit limit, and to transfer funds between their savings accounts
and checking accounts.
EFT systems are usually operated in connection with a bank at
facilities such as a supermarket, shopping center or some other loca-
tion not likely to have a bank office, but where people may find
themselves in need of additional funds, or where they will already
be transacting business. To activate the terminal, the user inserts
a plastic bank card, which has identifying information encoded on
it, into the computer terminal.'
1. Oklahoma ex. rel. State Banking Bd. v. Bank of Oklahoma, 409 F. Supp. 71, 85 (N.D.
Okla. 1975).
2. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1977, at 41, col. 1.
3. Some of the more frequently used terms to describe EFT systems are point-of-sale
terminals (POS), place of business terminals (POB), and customer-bank communications
terminals (CBCT). EFT system terminals will be referred to as CBCTs herein.
EFTs have been referred to in a variety of ways. However, they are commonly understood
to be remote computer terminals which are relatively small, ranging in size from a small
portable television set with a keyboard that resembles a typewriter to a device that resemb-
les a desk-sized adding machine. The terminals may be located within a store, or they may
be completely outside of stores or other buildings and they may be operated by the employ-
ees of the store in which they are located or by the bank customer. The reason for establish-
ing EFT systems is that they provide bank customers with convenient access to a number of
traditional banking services at locations that are often more convenient than bank offices.
They also provide customer access to many banking services at times that the banks them-
selves are not open.
The terminals may be either on-line (hooked directly into the bank's computer) or off-line
(not directly connected to the computer). If the computer is off-line, the customer will imme-
diately be able to type out his or her personal identification number. If it is on-line, the
computer will first verify that the card is valid and currently in effect and will then tell the
user to proceed to input the personal identification number. Next, in both systems, the user
selects the transactions desired. In an off-line system the terminal will proceed to honor the
user's request for a valid transaction. If the transaction is a withdrawal, the terminal will
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EFT systems have a number of advantages for financial institu-
tions. Because they can make banking far more convenient for cus-
tomers,4 they are likely to attract new customers, including those of
competitors that do not utilize these systems. They also eliminate
part of the cost of processing checks.5 Additionally, some bankers
view EFT systems as a means of reducing voluminious paperwork;'
over 27 billion checks are expected to be processed this year.7 One
banker estimated that it might reasonably be possible to save ten
cents on the processing of each check via EFT systems.' This would
be a savings of 2.7 billion dollars. Future savings might well be even
higher, since historically, the rate of growth of checks processed has
been seven per cent per year.'
Some banks see EFT systems as a way of cutting the cost of their
operations, by eliminating brick and mortar buildings,'0 and possi-
bly reducing the number of employees." The use of EFT systems
would also help eliminate lost checks.'" One New York bank, Citi-
bank, loses 7,000 checks per day.'"
EFT systems also have some disadvantages. Customer accept-
ance is by no means universal. Some banks have found the systems
to be very costly to maintain and with too few customers using them
to warrant their continued operation.'4 Additionally, this marvel of
modern technology has created problems with the banking and anti-
trust laws, as well as with the right to privacy. Furthermore, some
typically disgorge the requisite amount of pre-packaged currency (usually terminals contain
packets of twenty-five dollars and any number of packets up to the maximum allowed by that
particular EFT system can be provided to the user) and will then prepare a receipt in
duplicate and will give one copy to the user and keep the other for the bank's records. In an
on-line system, the terminal will first verify that the customer's account cpntains the neces-
sary funds at the time of the transaction before proceeding as the off-line system does. In all
EFT systems, the transactions must be verified and processed at the bank's offices before the
bank will consider them complete. The terminals are serviced daily.
4. N. Y. Times, May 31, 1977, at 41, cols. 1-2.
5. Id.
6. Id. at col. 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Oklahoma ex. rel. State Banking Bd. v. Bank of Oklahoma, 409 F. Supp. 71, 85 (N.D.
Okla. 1975).
10. N. Y. Times, May 31, 1977, at 41, col. 1.
11. See id.
12. Franklin, Regulation of EFT Revolution, 37 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 693, 697 n.21 (1976).
13. Id.
14. N. Y. Times, May 31, 1977, at 41, col. 1.
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small banks are afraid of being put out of business by the giants of
the banking industry if EFT systems are allowed; even regional
banks are not happy at the prospect of competition from the indus-
try giants via EFT systems. However, in view of government interest
as well as the interest being expressed by a number of the giants in
the banking industry, EFT systems seem to be here to stay. 5
This Comment will examine some of the legal problems which
have resulted from attempts by national banks to use EFT systems
in states which do not allow state banks to engage in branch bank-
ing. Initially it will focus on whether EFT systems are branch banks
under applicable federal law.
IL EFT Terminals: Are They Branch Banks?
A variety of court decisions, 6 the Comptroller of the Currency, 7
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 8 and the National Credit
Union Administration 9 (NCUA) have dealt with EFT systems. All
but the NCUA have addressed the question of whether an EFT
terminal is a branch of the bank which operates it. This question is
a particularly important one with respect to national banks (which
are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency), because of pos-
sible conflict between state and federal banking policy.
Historically, the United States has had a dual system of banking,
i.e. federal and state banks. The former are chartered and regulated
by the United States pursuant to the Constitution of the United
States and laws enacted by Congress; the latter are regulated by the
state which charters them, and are subject to its laws. Some states
legislatively permit their banks to establish branches either on a
limited" or unlimited basis,2' while the public policy of other states
favors a "unitary" banking system that absolutely prohibits the
establishment of any branches whatsoever.22
15. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.821 (West Cum. Pamphlet 1978).
16. See text accompanying notes 41-128 infra.
17. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1974), suspended 40 Fed. Reg. 49077, Oct. 21, 1975, rescinded 41
Fed. Reg. 36198, Aug. 27, 1976.
18. 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2 (1974), 12 C.F.R. § 545.14-5, 39 Fed. Reg. 2399, June 28, 1974,
corrected, 39 Fed. Reg. 26286, July 18, 1974.
19. 12 C.F.R. § 721.3 (1974).
20. Comment, Customer-Bank Communication Terminals and the McFadden Act Defini-
tion of a "Branch Bank", 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 362, 364 (1975).
21. See generally, Prives, Electronic Fund Transfer Systems and State Laws, 93 Banking
L.J. 527 (1976).
22. Regulations promulgated by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Home Loan
19781
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
In 1924, the United States Supreme Court held that federal banks
could not establish branches because the Federal Banking Act of
1864 contained no express statutory authorization. 3 State banking
systems were allowing their banks to branch and, as a result, federal
banks were hurt competitively to such an extent that the dual bank-
ing system was nearly destroyed." In 1927, Representative McFad-
den introduced a bill which permitted federally chartered banks
(national banks), with the approval of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, to establish branches in the same city in which they had their
main offices if state banks could do so.2" Congress passed the bill
and then amended it in 1933 to provide that federally chartered
banks could establish branches anywhere in the state in which they
were located if state banks were so authorized." Thus, state law,
in effect, controls federal banks with respect to the establishment
of branches. However, the Court has said that the federal definition
Bank Board and the National Credit Union Administration served as catalysts for states
opposed to branch banks on policy grounds and for banks to challenge the regulations in a
variety of court actions. Unfortunately, individual agencies have no way of limiting the
impact of their decisions to the institutions they supervise because competition in the finan-
cial industry is keen. If, for example, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board lets federally
chartered savings and loan institutions use EFT systems, national banks and credit unions
not allowed to use EFT systems are at a competitive disadvantage. To remedy this, the
agencies that control them will probably also allow these institutions to use EFT systems. In
fact, at least some of the regulations allowing the use of EFT systems probably occurred for
exactly this reason.
23. First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656-659 (1924).
24. Comment, Electronic Funds Transfer And Branch Banking-The Application of Old
Law to New Technology, 35 Md. L.R. 88, 90-93 (1975) [hereinafter EFT and Branch
Banking]. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker, 385 U.S. 252, 257 (1966).
25. EFT and Branch Banking, supra note 24, at 92.
26. Id. at 92-93. Section 36 provides in part:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city, town
or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are
at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question;
and (2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such
establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute
law of the State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirma-
tively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as
to location imposed by the law of the State on State banks.
12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
States vary widely in their treatment of branch banks. Some allow unlimited branching,
others allow no branching, some allow limited branching and one allows unlimited branching
* within the state and foreign countries. Comment, Customer-Bank Communication Terminals
and the McFadden Act Definition of a "Branch Bank", 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 362, 364 (1975).
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rather than state law applies to define "branch," for states would
have too much power if state law were allowed to govern the defini-
tion.27
Most problems with EFT systems have occurred because of the
definition of "branch" set out in section 36(f) of the McFadden Act.
It provides that the term branch includes branch banks, offices,
agencies of any "place of business"2" located in the United States
or its territories and the District of Columbia "(a)t which deposits
are received, or checks paid, or money lent." The Supreme Court
examined the legislative history of the McFadden Act in First
National Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co. 9 and concluded that
Congress' purpose was to provide for "competitive equality" be-
tween state and federal banks °.3 Accordingly, in 1969, the Court
held in First National Bank v. Dickinson,3' that "... (N)ot merely
the contractual rights and liabilities created by the transaction, but
all those aspects of the transaction that might give the bank an
advantage in its competition for customers" must be considered
when determining whether a facility is a "branch bank."3
In the Dickinson case, the Court found that an armored car serv-
ice and a stationary facility to which customers could take money
for transmittal to the bank's main office for deposit there were
branch banks. The bank's contractual arrangement with its custom-
ers stipulated that the debtor-creditor relationship would not arise
until the funds were in the bank's main office and the crediting of
the customer's accounts completed; but the Court said the intent
of parties to a private contractual agreement was not binding for
purposes of interpreting a federal law.
Almost all of the courts which have applied the McFadden Act
test have found that at least one of the transactions commonly
permitted by EFT systems met the Dickinson interpretation of the
"branch bank" test. While most courts agree that deposits are made
at EFT terminals,3 there is wide disagreement over whether money
27. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 133 (1969), rehearing denied, 396 U.S.
1047 (1970).
28. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
29. 385 U.S. 252 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967).
30. Id. at 261.
31. 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
32. Id. at 136-37.
33. E.g., Colorado ex. rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979 (D.
Colo. 1975).
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is withdrawn or checks cashed." Several courts have held that these
functions are performed, 5 and at least one court refused to decide.
the issue. 6
In recent years, legislation dealing with EFTs has proliferated,
with 20 states enacting a variety of EFTs legislation in one year. 7
Some statutes provide that EFTs are not branch banks.3" The New
York, New Jersey and Oregon acts,39 say that they are branches,
while other legislation seems to imply that banking transactions are
conducted. only at a bank and not at remote terminals. 0
34. -Illinois ex. rel. Lignoui v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 409 F. Supp.
1167 (N.D. Ill. 1975), Independent Banker's Ass'n v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1975),
Oklahoma ex. rel. State Banking Bd. v. Bank of Oklahoma, 409 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Okla.
1975).
35. Colorado ex. rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977); Independent Banker's Association v. Smith, 402 F. Supp.
207 (D.D.C. 1975).
36. Missouri ex. rel. Kostman v. First Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 941 (1976).
37. Prives, Electronic Fund Transfer Systems and State Laws, 93 Banking L.J. 527 (1976)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter State Laws].
38. Id. at 570.
39. Id. at 570 n.76.
40. Id. at 570. Some states require different banks to share the same EFT equipment, id.
at 556, others permit such sharing, id., a few require some institutions to share and permit
others to do so. Id. Still others are silent on this point. Id. at 553.
For an excellent discussion of some of the problems which sharing provisions of state EFTs
laws may cause, see id. at 553-64. For a discussion of possible antitrust problems which the
use of EFT systems may create, see Ubell, Electronic Fund Transfer and Antitrust Laws, 93
Banking L.J. 43 (1976); Vernard, Some Antitrust Issues Raised by Large Electronic Fund
Transfer Systems, 25 Cath. U.L. Rev. 749 (1976); Murray, EFTs and Antitrust-Some Reflec-
tions On The Possibilities, 37 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673 (1976); Note, The Effect of the Use of
Customer Bank Communications Terminals on Competition Among Financial Institutions,
45 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 591 (1976). For a more general discussion of the application of antitrust
laws to banking services, see Comment, Applying Federal Antitrust Law to Banking Serv-
ices-Non-Interest Bearing Accounts, 25 Me. L.R. 315 (1973).
Additionally, a few states voice concern with privacy, while most say nothing about it.
State Laws, supra note 37, at 572. Some define EFT systems narrowly, Id. at 543-544, while
still other states offer no definition. Id. at 542-44. In short, there is no uniformity among the
states on this subject. For a general discussion of the privacy provisions of EFT laws in those
states which have' such provisions, see id. at 572-74.
It should also be noted that although case law to date has dealt with the type of EFT system
described above, at least one commentator has said that a number of EFT systems might be
the subject of legislation. They are:
(1) Automated teller machines;
(2) Points-of-Sale terminals (handling transactions in retail stores);
(3) Service-counter terminals (handling deposits and withdrawals in retail stores);
(4) Telephone banking services in the home;
(5) Check and credit verification (sponsored by financial institutions, bank card
systems, credit cards or retailers);
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A. Court EFT Decisions
State of Colorado ex. rel. State Banking Board v. First National
Bank4' was one of the first cases to consider the EFT-branch bank
question. Pursuant to authority granted by the Comptroller of the
Currency the defendant established an EFT system which had a
customer bank communications terminal at a shopping center
about two and eight-tenths miles from the bank. The terminal, a
self-contained unit, was not staffed by any bank personnel. The
customer could obtain pre-packaged funds in amounts of $25.00 or
$50.00 which constituted a withdrawal from the customer's account,
or could obtain funds against a previously established line of credit.
The customer could also make deposits and transfer funds between
checking and savings accounts. 2
Colorado prohibited branch banking, but the court noted that it
was common for customers of state and federal banks to make de-
posits by mail, using envelopes supplied by the banks. Bank cus-
tomers often transferred funds between accounts by means of wire
or telephone communications, and Colorado commercial banks also
extended a line of credit to commercial customers.
The court, relying on the Walker case, found that Congress in-
tended to provide for "competitive equality" between state and
federal banks when it passed the McFadden Act. Furthermore, the
court applied the Dickinson test to determine whether the remote
terminal was a branch bank. Judge Matsch saw no functional differ-
ence between the terminal and the stationary deposit facility in
Dickinson. Therefore, he concluded that insofar as deposits were
accepted by the terminal, it was a branch bank.4 3
However, Judge Matsch further found that checks were not being
(6) Automated clearing houses;
(7) 'Future systems' with uncertain characteristics under sponsorship by financial
and nonfinancial institutions.
Id. at 583.
Many of these areas are already subject to EFT laws. For a discussion of some of the
problems created by such legislation, see id. at 544-50. However, discussion of state EFT
statutes is outside the scope of this Comment and will not be discussed further.
41. 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975).
42. Two individuals collected the transaction forms, checks and currency from the ter-
minal each day and otherwise serviced the terminal. All of the material was taken to the
bank's main office for verification and processing into computer readable characters and sent
to the computer center for appropriate action. Id. at 982.
43. Id. at 984.
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cashed nor money lent by the terminal. He said that instructing the
bank by pressing keys on the terminal did not meet the definition
of "check" provided by Uniform Commercial Code, section 4-3-
104(2) 4" or by Webster's Dictionary." Therefore, Judge Matsch
found that a transaction in which a customer obtains funds from
his checking account does not constitute the cashing of a check."8
The court also refused to find that money was being lent at the
terminal when customers received funds against a pre-arranged line
of credit. The court saw no functional difference between such a
transaction and the use of a credit card to obtain goods or services
from retailers.47 The court also found that the transfer of funds
between accounts was not branch banking.4"
Consequently, it held that the deposit function of the terminal
was illegal since it constituted "branch banking;" but the other
transactions were permissible, since they were authorized by the
Comptroller of the Currency and did not constitute branch bank-
ing.49
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the decision with respect to the deposit function. However,
it said that the withdrawal of funds and the transfer of funds be-
tween accounts met the requirements of the McFadden Act and
constituted branch banking. 0 Thus, none of those functions could
be performed through an EFT terminal without violating the state
banking law. The court found that the district court reached its
decision because of the "manner in which (the) bank's CBCT (cus-
tomer bank communcations terminal) permitted the withdrawal of
pre-packaged packets of money. . and also permitted the transfer
of funds . . . .Such reasoning . unduly emphasizes form at the
expense of substance and fails to follow the admonition of the Su-
44. Id. at 984-85. UCC § 3-104(2) reads in part: "A writing which complies with the
requirements of this section is (a) a 'draft' ('bill of exchange') if it is an order; (b) a 'check' if
it is a draft on a bank and payable on demand; ....
45. WESTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 381 (unabr. ed. 1964).
46. 394 F. Supp. at, 984-85.
47. Id. at 985. There is a major controlling difference between CBCTs and the use of credit
cards to obtain goods and services. The former is established or operated by a bank; the latter
is not. This distinction is crucial to the application of the McFadden Act.
48. Id. at 984.
49. Id. at 985.
50. 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
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preme Court. . . that '§36(f) must not be given a restrictive mean-
ing that would frustrate the congressional intent this Court found
to be plain in Walker Bank' . . . ." The congressional intent re-
ferred to was that national and state banks be in a position of
competitive equality.
The court said it was not necessary to find that the withdrawal
and transfer of funds fit the "traditional molds of 'checks paid' or
'money lent' as used in 36(f)"52 because, "that section declared that
the term 'branch' shall include any branch place of business where
deposits are received or checks paid, or money lent."5 The court of
appeals also found that the Dickinson decision teaches that section
36(f) is indefinite with respect to the ou-ter limits of that definition;
the statute specifies general minimum requirements for finding a
facility to be a branch bank but does not provide guidance on what
may be a branch bank if the statutory standards are not met. Never-
theless, it said that any place where deposits are received, checks
paid or money lent is a branch bank. Thus, the withdrawal of funds
and transfer of funds from one account to another would be consid-
ered banking transactions prohibited by the Colorado anti-
branching statute.
It is clear that the trial court erred when it found that checks were
not being cashed nor money lent at the remote terminal. The trial
court failed to apply the "owned or operated" prong of the section
36(f) test. Had it done so, the difference between credit card trans-
actions and remote terminal functions would have been apparent.
The machines into which credit cards are placed to record transac-
tions are not owned or operated by a bank, but a bank was the owner
of the remote terminals in the instant case. Thus, the trial court's
failure to apply both prongs of the section 36(f) test resulted in its
erroneous analysis of the functions the terminal was performing.
The court of appeals' analysis of the facts and applicable case law
is sounder. Truly, it places the substance of the law over the form
of particular transactions.
Independent Bankers' Association of America v. Smith" resulted
in the withdrawal of the regulation authorizing national banks to
51. Id. at 499 (emphasis in original).
52. Id.
53. Id. (emphasis in original).
54. 402 F. Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1975).
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use EFTs. Plaintiff sought judicial review of an interpretative deci-
sion of the Comptroller of the Currency which opined that off-
premises customer bank communications terminals (CBCTs) were
not "branch banks" within the meaning of the McFadden Act, and
authorized their use by national banks even where state banks could
not establish branches. The trial court disagreed with the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency. It found that EFTs are branch banks. The court
of appeals affirmed in an exhaustive opinion. It examined the valid-
ity of the Comptroller's decision, that EFTs were not branch banks
and discussed the legislative history of the McFadden Act. The
court next examined the concepts of federalism and competitive
equality, as well as the federal definition of branch bank and the
manner in which that definition has been interpreted by courts.5
The court of appeals decision is particularly noteworthy for its af-
firmance of the district court's finding that all CBCTs perform at
least one of the three functions which constitute "branch banking"
under the McFadden Act,5" and must comply with all relevant fed-
eral law on the establishment of branch banks even in those states
which permit branching.5"
A national bank may not establish a CBCT in an anti-branching
state which views CBCTs as branches. 8 However, the court went on
to state that if an anti-branching state was to determine adminis-
tratively that a CBCT is not a branch under state law and permitted
state banks to establish them, federal banks could also do so despite
the clear language of section 36(f) which requires affirmative statu-
tory authority for national banks to establish branches in a given
state.59 The court said the Comptroller can "consider and follow
. . . administrative opinion or ruling interpreting the state's
branching laws so long as that opinion does not violate the anti-
branching standard imposed by statute law of the state." 0
The court further indicated that a narrow reading of section 36(c)
could destroy the competitive equality Congress intended to foster.
55. 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976). The opinion provides an
excellent overview of the functions of EFTs terminals and of their relationship to the McFad-
den Act.
56. Id. at 934.
57. Id. at 948.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 948-49 n.104.
60. Id.
[Vol. VI
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It reasoned that such a narrow reading would enable state banks to
establish CBCTs as a result of an administrative decision, while
national banks would not be able to do so absent affirmative statu-
tory authority.' The court concluded that, for this reason, section
36(c) must be read broadly in a way that provides for continuance
of competitive equality between state and national banks with re-
spect to branching.2
Whether the Supreme Court will be willing to accept this well
reasoned dicta and sanction such a radical departure from existing
law is questionable. The Court's fairly narrow reading of the
McFadden Act can be seen in the Logan and Dickinson cases, but
the Court has given great weight to the intent of Congress and the
doctrine of competitive equality in the past and might well do so
again. Since the McFadden Act was adopted to preserve a dual
banking system, it would be particularly ironic if it was interpreted
so strictly as to destroy the very system whose life it previously
saved. In view of Congress' intent that federal and state banks com-
pete with each other on equal terms, the Supreme Court should
adopt the reasoning of the court of appeals.
The importance which states place on their banking policy and
on the doctrine of competitive equality is illustrated by Missouri ex.
rel. W. R. Kostman v. First National Bank of St. Louis. 3 In that
case, the State Commissioner of Finance sued the respondent bank
for violation of the state's banking laws. Missouri law permits a
bank to operate two offices in the same city in which the main office
is located, if it has the approval of the Commissioner of Finance.
Respondent was operating the three offices permitted. It then
placed two EFT terminals in operation in a different county from
that in which its offices were located. The general public had access
to one of these terminals. 4
The federal district court, relying on section 36(f) of the McFad-
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 405 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
64. The EFTs allowed customers to select from among the following transactions: obtain
pre-packaged cash by debiting the customer's savings or checking account or charging the
amount against the customer's Master Charge account at the bank, make deposits to savings
and checking accounts, transfer funds from one account to another and make payments on
obligations to the bank by cash or by debiting the customer's savings or checking account.
The terminals were serviced daily by a bank employee.
1978]
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den Act, section 362.707 of the Missouri Statutes and the Dickin-
son and Walker decisions, found that the terminal was a branch
bank in violation of Missouri law. The court did not indicate
whether only one or all of the section 36(f) tests were met. The
eighth circuit affirmed per curiam 15 It concluded that deposits were
made but indicated that it had not reached the question of whether
checks were paid or money lent because its finding with respect to
deposits was sufficient for a finding that the terminals were "branch
banks.""
If national banks are again permitted to use EFTs, that decision
is likely to engender future litigation to determine Whether termin-
als which do not accept deposits but do perform the other transac-
tions mentioned are "branch banks." Even though the Comptroller
of the Currency suspended his decision authorizing national banks
to establish EFT systems, 7 federally chartered savings and loan
associations" and credit unions" are still authorized to establish
them. Such terminals might be challenged as illegal banks under
state law. This is most likely to occur in those states which do not
allow state banks, savings and loan institutions or credit unions to
establish branches.
One of the reasons this may be a problem is that Congress has not
provided for "competitive equality" between federally chartered
thrift institutions and their state counterparts. Neither has Con-
gress provided for "competitive equality between thrift institutions
and national banks. The United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Oklahoma considered this problem in Oklahoma ex.
rel. State Banking Board v. Bank of Oklahoma.70 It reasoned that
state thrift institutions which were allowed to establish EFT sys-
65. 538 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976).
66. Id. at 539 n.1.
67. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
68. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has established its own branching regulations
with which national savings and loan associations must comply. These regulations require
compliance with certain procedures and also prohibit branching in states where anti-
branching policy is so strong that no state bank is allowed to establish branches. 12 C.F.R. §
556.5(b)(b)(1). Congress left the definition of branch to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
with respect to federal savings and loan associations and it says that EFTs terminals are not
branches. Oklahoma ex rel. State Banking Board v. Bank of Oklahoma, 409 F. Supp. 71, 92-
93 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
69. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
70. 409 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
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tems would have an unfair advantage over state banks and federal
thrift institutions which were not permitted to use EFT systems.7
The Oklahoma banking commissioner authorized state financial
institutions to use EFT systems and brought suit to prevent the
respondent federal bank from using such systems. The district court
held that EFT systems are not branches under 22 U.S.C. § 36(f).
The two respondent federal banks were operating EFT systems
which could transfer customer funds from one account to another
and which allowed customers to make deposits to, and withdrawals
from their accounts, take advantage of pre-arranged lines of credit
and pay bills.
The court reached several conclusions of law which seem directly
opposed to the teachings of the Dickinson case. However, the court
indicated that the facts in the instant case could be distinguished
from those in Dickinson, without further elaboration. Furthermore,
the court found that the Dickinson decision is limited to its facts.
Chief Judge Barrow found as a matter of law that 22 U.S.C. §
24(7) permits national banks to exercise those incidental powers,
express or implied, which are necessary to carry on the banking
business." He concluded that operation of remote terminals is nec-
essary and incidental to carry on a banking business.74 The court
further held that the legislative history of the McFadden Act reveals
that ". . . Congressional debate discloses that branches as 'then
71. Id. at 92-93.
72. The Oklahoma State Bank Commissioner regulated state commercial banks and all
state-chartered financial institutions including savings and loan associations, credit unions
and trust companies. However, he did not treat all such institutions equally. The Commis-
sioner allowed all state financial institutions except banks to establish EFT systems. Addi-
tionally, at least one state bank notified him in writing, of its intention to establish an EFT
system. The Commissioner approved the remote terminal since he considered that state law
permitted its operation. However, the Commissioner was aware that at least one national
bank had been using an off-line automated teller machine for over two and one-half years.
This machine performed the same functions as the respondents' EFT systems. While the
Commissioner had the authority to initiate legal action to try to prevent this use, he took no
action.
One of the respondents' defenses which was not ruled on by the court was that a determina-
tion that EFT systems were branch banks would violate the 14th amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and the due process clause of the Oklahoma State Constitution.
73. However, in Independent Bankers of Oregon v. Camp., 357 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Ore.
1973), the court heid that specific state statutory authorization is required for the establish-
ment of any branch bank, including EFTs, by national banks. Where state law is silent, no
such authorization exists.
74. 409 F. Supp. at 90.
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conceived' by Congress were separate and complete banking estab-
lishments staffed by people where general banking business was
conducted."7 The court concluded from the testimony of several
expert banking witnesses that no deposit is received until after the
items tendered have been verified or counted and credited to the
account of the depositor. It said that plastic bank cards and identifi-
cation numbers are not checks, do not meet the statutory definition
found in the UCC and are not the written instruments contemplated
by the McFadden Act.76 Additionally, checks, like deposits, are not
considered to be paid as opposed to cashed, until they are presented
to the drawee bank. They must then be verified as'to genuineness
and amount and the account balance must be sufficient. The
amount is then debited and the check photographed, cancelled and
its use in commerce ended." Another reason for the court's finding
that the terminal was not a branch bank is that disbursing cash does
not automatically create a loan. Instead personal judgment of a
bank officer is necessary to the making of a loan. The customer and
the bank must agree on the terms before the bank can disburse
funds to the customer. The court indicated that the bank's obliga-
tion to provide the funds and the borrower's commitment to repay
them become effective when the terms of the loan are negotiated
and the instruments evidencing the agreement are executed. A loan
is not made at a location where only funds are provided.7 8 The court
added that this is true of all extensions of credit.79 Therefore, the
terminal was not making loans to customers merely by disbursing
prepackaged funds to them up to their credit limit.
In reaching these conclusions, the court ignored the admonition
of the Dickinson Court that the intent of private contractual agree-
ments is not binding on federal courts interpreting federal law. In-
stead, the overall effect of the transactions must be considered in
applying the McFadden Act definition of branching."0 The district
court did say, however, that the Supreme Court's determination in
Dickinson is limited to the facts in that case, and can be distin-
75. Id.
76. Id. at 91.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. First National Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 133 (1966), rehearing denied, 396 U.S.
1047 (1970).
[Vol. VI584
ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS
guished on the facts from those before the court." The court also
found as a matter of fact that a remote terminal is closely analogous
to a telephone, telegraph or mailbox through which bank customers
may communicate their instructions for certain routine transac-
tions.
While this telephone-remote terminal analogy is certainly a logi-
cal one, it ignores one key difference between telephones and ter-
minals. Customers instructing their banks by telephone are using
their own instruments, or at least the instruments are not owned by
the bank; remote terminals are owned or leased by banks which
provide them for the convenience of their customers. A bank is not
establishing or operating its customers' telephones, but it is estab-
lishing or operating remote terminals. This difference is crucial
under the McFadden Act. 2 A facility not owned or operated by a
bank cannot be a branch bank. However, the same facility, if owned
or operated by a bank, may meet the test for being considered a
branch. Thus, the holding in this case seems to be in error since the
court did not consider this difference between telephone and ter-
minal banking.
An underlying concern of Judge Barrow's decision may have been
one of fairness and the preservation of competitive equality between
all state financial institutions and their federal counterparts even
though Congress has not specifically mandated equality among all
financial institutions. In a footnote, the court said: "The Court feels
that under . . . the evidence in this litigation, if other financial
institutions in this State are allowed .. .to engage in the use of
CBCTs but they are prohibited to the defendant banks, it would
create, no doubt, unfair treatment, inequality, and undue hardship
on the banks . . . .The doctrine of competitive equality requires
that a national bank not be denied '. . . privileges which the State
is allowing other institutions to exercise' . .'.8."3
The Oklahoma decision was concerned with the fair treatment of
federal banks and the inequities which would result if state financial
institutions could establish EFT systems and federal banks could
not. A Nebraska case involved the reverse situation 8-an attempt
81. 409 F. Supp. at 92.
82. 12 USC 36(c).
83. 409 F. Supp. at 92-93.
84. Nebraska ex rel. Meyer v. American Community Stores Corp., 193 Neb. 634, 228
N.W.2d 299 (1975).
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to prevent a federal savings and loan association from using an EFT
system when state banks could not. Since federal savings and loan
associations are not subject to the competitive equality provisions
of the McFadden Act, the state could not directly challenge the
savings and loan association's EFT system. Therefore, the state
attorney general brought a quo warranto proceeding 5 to revoke the
charter of the corporation that had an EFT system terminal in two
of its supermarkets. The attorney-general asserted that the terminal
was really a bank being operated in violation of state banking laws.86
Although the challenge was unsuccessful in Nebraska, the result
might well be different in another state. 7
The court held that Hinky Dinky was not engaging in illegal
banking activities. 8 It reasoned that the Transmatic Money Service
(TMS) was expressly authorized by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) which has jurisdiction over all federal savings and
loan associations and that Hinky Dinky was merely acting as an
intermediary between the customers and First Federal. 89 The court
pointed out that the banker-depositor relationship can only be cre-
ated by contract, express or implied. 0 The debtor-creditor relation-
ship essential to a bank deposit or withdrawal never exists between
the customer and Hinky Dinky." The computer terminal merely
85. Id., 228 N.W.2d at 300.
86. Id. at 635, 228 N.W.2d at 300.
87. In the Nebraska case, the respondent, a Texas corporation, operated 35 supermarkets
called "Hinky Dinky" stores in Nebraska. Two of the stores had computer terminals which
were installed by the First Federal Savings and Loan Association pursuant to authority
granted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The terminals enabled customers to make
withdrawals from, or deposits to their First Federal accounts. The service, known as trans-
matic money service (TMS) was put into operation on an experimental basis from January
14, 1974 to March 1, 1974 and was then temporarily suspended. It was later resumed. During
the experimental period, deposits of $333,085.80 were made via TMS in the two Hinky Dinky
stores. There was a total of 3,169 transactions for an average of $117.92 per transaction during
the period.
State chartered savings and loan associations were permitted to maintain agents in areas
in which they had no branch or home office. The agents were permitted to accept and
transmit deposits or withdrawal requests to their main office or to make on the spot withdraw-
als. They could also solicit business and conduct other activities for the home office. At trial,
the State Assistant Director of Banking testified that there was no law in Nebraska which
covered the activities of such agents nor was there anything that would prohibit any person
from acting as such an agent. Thus, Hinky Dinky stores could have acted as agents for a state
savings and loan association.
88. Id. at 640, 228 N.W.2d at 303.
89. Id. at 639, 228 N.W.2d at 303.
90. Id. at 638, 228 N.W.2d at 302.
91. Id. at 639, 228 N.W.2d at 302.
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transmits information to the central computer in First Federal
which electronically effects the transactions and perfects the records
on the premises of First Federal." Therefore, the store is merely
acting as a financial and operational intermediary, not as a bank. 3
The court said that since Hinky Dinky does not accept or retain
deposits nor promise to repay them, it is not engaging in banking
activity or in the business of a savings and loan association. 4 The
court's conclusion is correct, although the result is not terribly fair
to state financial institutions. Hinky Dinky's relationship is analo-
gous to that between a store that accepts credit cards and the issu-
ing company. It is an independent contractor which is providing a
service for its customers' convenience in both cases. It should not
be found to have engaged in a wholly new business solely because
of this.
In Bloomfield Federal Savings and Loan Association v. American
Community Stores Corp., 5 the plaintiff charged the defendant cor-
poration with violating the antitrust laws and the branching regula-
tions established by the FHLBB because of its use of computer
terminals in its Hinky Dinky stores. (This case involved the same
EFT system discussed in the Nebraska state court case.) Here, the
plaintiff alleged that the FHLBB had adopted the regulation allow-
ing EFT systems without authority pursuant to the Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933, and said that each terminal was a branch office
established in violation of the Board's procedural requirements. The
plaintiff further argued that Hinky Dinky made unsecured loans in
violation of section 5(c) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 and
the rules adopted thereunder.
The court found that the Home Owner's Loan Act grants FHLBB
exclusive authority to regulate federal savings and loan associa-
tions.9  This authority and substantial case law authorized the
Board's promulgation of its EFT system regulation.97 A critical fac-
tor in analyzing EFT systems is that no debtor-creditor relationship
exists between the store and its customers in relation to the with-
92. Id.
93. Id., 228 N.W.2d at 302-303.
94. Id., 228 N.W.2d at 303.
95. 396 F. Supp. 384 (D. Neb. 1975).
96. Id. at 386.
97. Id. at 387-88.
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drawal or deposit of funds." Therefore, the terminal is only a con-
duit of information." In this respect the court's reasoning is essen-
tially the same as that of the Nebraska decision. This court also
reasoned that an EFT system which does not allow the making of
loans, opening of new accounts or acceptance of deposits is not a
branch bank and therefore, does not violate Board branching regu-
lations.'" Further, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant summary
judgment on plaintiff's claim that unsecured loans were being
made.'10 While there were temporary deficits in Hinky Dinky's First
Federal account on six days, they were for three short periods from
one evening to the next morning."' New procedures which would
eliminate the possibility of such an occurence in the future were put
into effect."13 For that reason the plaintiffs did not have standing
to raise the issue nor could the court have decided it even if they
did because the litigant's rights would no longer be affected as a
result of the new procedures." 4
The court's assumption that an EFT system must make loans,
open new accounts or accept deposits to be considered a branch
bank is correct. Clearly, section 36(f) is written in the disjunctive
and any one of the functions it describes is sufficient for a finding
that branch banking is occurring. However, the court's finding
that deposits were not made is erroneous, although the court's
conclusion in the case is sound, for the same reasons as the Ne-
braska state court case.
A case with still a different view of the functions of EFT systems
is Illinois ex rel. Lignoui v. Continental Illinois National Bank and
Trust Company of Chicago."0 ' There, the court concluded that
CBCTs receive deposits and lend money but do not cash checks.
Judge Hubert Will, relied on the Dickinson opinion and its holding
that the effect of transactions on competitive equality rather than
the contractual agreement of individuals governs in determining
whether deposits are received. He found that CBCTs do receive
deposits.'" However, payments on credit card accounts and install-
98. Id. at 387.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 389.
101. Id. at 391.
102. Id. at 390.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 390-91.
105. 409 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
106. Id. at 1177.
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ment loans are not deposits. The court concluded that they are
payments on existing loan obligations, rather than deposits into an
account which the customer may later withdraw."7
The court rejected respondents' arguments that the cash ad-
vances which CBCTs provide are not "money lent" because the
bank exercises no discretion when payments are disbursed. Respon-
dents claimed that the loan is made at the time a line of credit is
established."8 Judge Will wrote:
The contracts underlying the issuance of credit cards with respect to cash
advances are, in effect, agreements to make small loans to the customer at
some future presentation of a valid card. That agreement does not transfer
any funds and, therefore, is not a loan as urged by defendants. Nor is interest
charged with the opening or establishing of a line of credit. The funds are
transferred and interest commences when the CBCT disburses the requested
number of $25 packets up to $100.00. That is when and where the loan is
made.101
The Illinois court further held that CBCTs do not cash checks."0
This was based on an analysis of section 3-104(2) of the UCC and
the court's finding that "[Niegotiability, the transferability of the
instrument (check) from the payee or holder to a third party, is the
essential characteristic of a check." ' The court reasoned that in-
serting a card into a CBCT is not the equivalent of cashing a check
because there is no written instrument and no third party designa-
tion is involved, although an analogy can be drawn between the
CBCT transaction and a bearer instrument presented for payment
by the maker.' It added, however, that this limited similarity to
checks does not transform the withdrawal of cash from a checking
or savings account, or by use of a Master Charge card, into the
cashing of checks under section 36(f).1 13
The court of appeals affirmed most of the trial court's decision.
However, it disagreed with the holding that the withdrawal of cash
and payments on installment loans do not constitute forms of
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1178.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1177-78.
111. Id. at 1177.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1177-78.
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branch banking."' These holdings were reversed. The court added
its own comments on these functions."' It said the customer's card
serves the same purpose as the check."' "It is an order to the
bank.""' 7 It added that any properly executed order by a customer
to the bank has to be considered to be a routine banking transaction
when used as here."8 Furthermore, it said that section 3-104(3) of
the UCC expands the definition of check to include non-negotiable
instruments."' Finally, the court found CBCT transactions to be
made pursuant to a written agreement between the bank and its
customer which clearly makes the withdrawal a routine banking
function.'
The reasoning of the court of appeals is correct. In today's world
of electronics and computers, the substance of a transaction-not
whether it is made by traditional means or via new technol-
ogy-should govern. The trial court's view with respect to the with-
drawal of cash and payment on installment loans failed to delve
beneath the surface of modern technology to discover its substance.
III. EFT Systems and Privacy
In recent years, increased concern over the individual's right to
privacy in this area has been expressed. The United States Supreme
Court found that the Constitution guarantees a right of privacy in
cases dealing with abortion 2' and the availability of contraceptives
for married couples 22 but there has been no agreement on the spe-
cific basis of that right. Assuming a right to privacy does exist, it
means nothing unless it is enforced. With the coming of age of
computers, the personal privacy of Americans is in far greater jeop-
ardy than at any time in the past.
114. Illinois ex. rel. Lignoui v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 536 F.2d 176
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976).
115. 536 F.2d at 178.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. U.C.C. § 3-104(3) reads: "As used in other Articles of this Act, and as the context
may require, the terms 'draft', 'check', 'certificate of deposit' and 'note' may refer to instru-
ments which are not negotiable within this Article as well as to instruments which are so
negotiable." Id.
120. 536 F.2d at 178.
121. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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The use of EFT systems presents further threats to privacy. The
Privacy Protection Study Commission (Commission)- was created to
look at the area of personal privacy and to recommend means of
protecting the individual's right to it. One of the areas the Commis-
sion examined was EFT systems. It also studied automated clearing
houses which constitute one aspect of such systems.
The Commission found that EFT systems are generally not de-
signed in a way that causes major threats to personal privacy. This
is primarily because the systems are still in their infancy.'23 It is very
likely that future systems or updated current ones will be capable
of creating massive privacy problems for users. 24 The Commission
further found that as EFT systems expand, they will very likely
include more personal information about individuals than is neces-
sary for the maintenance of accounts, records will be more central-
ized and, more easily retrievable than at present and financial re-
cords will include information that is not usually considered to be
payment data. 5 In fact, as access to such systems increases, it may
be necessary to use fingerprints and similar information to identify
users in order to guard against unauthorized disclosures. 2, Not only
may EFT records include more information than is necessary for
fund transfers, they may actually become generalized information
transfer systems. 127 Pressure for such a development currently ex-
ists.'2
A. Government Access to Personal Information
Government agencies are frequent users of bank records. 29 Be-
cause of this, EFT systems may make it possible for the government
to quickly retrieve massive amounts of information about individu-
als at will-including information on the vast majority of people
who have broken no laws. Even at present, banks are not the only
users of bank records. Such records are often used for law enforce-
ment purposes. 130 In fact, bank records are routinely disclosed to
123. THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION: PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION SYSTEM 116 (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY REPORT].
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 118.
127. Id. at 116.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 117-18.
130. Id.
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various government agencies conducting investigations-or fishing
expeditions.' 3 ' Certainly, a potential use for EFT systems is elec-
tronic eavesdropping.' 2 Information flowing through an EFT net-
work can be monitored electronically and only certain specified
items or all of the data can be captured.' 3 This could lead to a fairly
rapid way of locating individuals. 3 Furthermore, such monitoring
would not require illegitimate entry into the system; it could be
done by anyone with access to the computer equipment that directs
and sorts the flow of information.'33 At present, the response time
of EFT systems is hours or days so the temptation to use them is
not too great. But they could become much more attractive sources
of personal data if the EFT systems become transaction oriented
since this would create a much more dynamic system.'3
Additionally, point of sale terminals must be monitored and mon-
itoring the transactions could become another way of tracking an
individual's movements.' 37 Moreover, once the government acquires
information about an individual, it is likely to retain it.
The potential for government use and abuse of EFT systems is
great. What is even more troubling is that most people are unaware
of the existence of such a problem. Additionally, some people who
are familiar with it may feel that an existing federal law, commonly
known as the Privacy Act,' 31 protects them. It is true that the Pri-
vacy Act prohibits federal agencies from collecting and maintaining
more personal information about individuals than they need. It also
places restrictions on their ability to disseminate that information
without the written consent of the individual about whom it is
maintained. However, the Act applies only if the information is kept
131. Id. at 116 & n.27.
132. Id. at 120.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 122.
Although the Commission report only discussed this aspect of the privacy problem with
reference to requests to the Federal Reserve System for information it has or will have as a
result of the automated clearing house it is operating, nevertheless, agencies such as the
Internal Revenue Service request and receive records from banks. In fact, one of the reasons
for the Bank Secrecy Act was to insure that federal agencies would have access to the informa-
tion they believe they need in order to function effectively. Id. at 118 & n.29.
137. Id. at 122.
138. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970).
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in a "system of records" that is retrievable by "individual identi-
fier."139
It does not provide nearly as much protection of the right of pri-
vacy as one might assume. This is because the Privacy Act requires
federal agencies to define their own systems of records. 140 Further-
more, an agency must also specify the routine uses for which that
information will be disclosed.' When a use of information is de-
fined as routine, the agency does not need the individual's consent
to disclose it for any routine use,' although it must keep a written
record of the disclosure. The record includes the name of the reques-
tor, address, information disclosed, the purpose for which it was
requested and the date of disclosure.' The individual about whom
the information was disclosed generally has access to this account-
ing record.'
139. Id. § 552(b). "System of records" is defined in section 552(a)(5).
140. Id. § 552(e)(4).
141. Id. § 552(b)(2).
142. Id. § 552(b)(3).
143. Id. § 552(c).
144. If any agency learns, after it has provided information to another party, that the data
it sent was incorrect or if the individual involved used statutory procedures to file a notice of
disagreement with the information, the agency must send the corrected information or a copy
of the notice of disagreement to anyone to whom it recently released the information.
While the Privacy Act provides some measure of protection for personal privacy, it does
not adequately protect individuals from the invasion of privacy that is possible with EFT and
other computer systems nor does it provide protection from disclosure by non-government
parties which are not subject to it.
The Privacy Act prohibits federal agencies from gathering and maintaining personal infor-
mation about individuals if they do not need it.
Automated clearing house (ACH) services are similar to the EFT systems used by individu-
als, except that they service institutions. PRIvAcY REPORT, supra note 123, at 115. ACHs affect
debits and credits of a recurring nature between institutions. Id. The funds transferred may
be insurance premiums, social security benefits, wages, or any other type of rectirring pay-
ment. Id. ACHs differ from point-of-sale terminals mainly by the type of transactions they
process, institutional controls over the system and the processing details. Id. This difference
will probably continue for the forseeable future. Id.
The Federal Reserve System presently operates all but two of the ACHs in use throughout
the country. Id. at 116. Although telecommunications networks were not essential to early
ACH systems, they are now used to link ACHs across the country together in order to make
interregional transfers easier. Id. ACHs run by the Federal Reserve System may well repre-
sent the greatest threat to personal privacy of any part of an EFT system. The Commission
said:
Most significant from the personal privacy viewpoint, the Federal Reserve System,
which acts as a fiscal agent of financial institutions and the Treasury Department in
some respects, is not constrained by either its government or its commercial clients,
much less by any individual bank client, from disclosing information about a bank
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At present, most individuals are probably in the records of only a
limited number of federal agencies. The information such agencies
have may be limited only to their sphere of operation.' Neverthe-
less, many more agencies may obtain access to information in EFT
systems if the Federal Reserve System is allowed to provide auto-
mated clearinghouse services for banks. 4 '
B. Extensive Data Communications Networks
EFT services are also likely to need extensive data communica-
tion networks.'47 This will result in various information being re-
tained for billing and accounting purposes within different portions
of the data communications network. 4 ' This further increases
available sources of personal information about individuals and the
threat that an individual's right to privacy will be violated. To
combat these potential problems before they occur, the Commission
made the following recommendations:
That individually identifiable account information generated in the provision
of EFT services be retained only in the account records of the financial
institutions and other parties to a transaction, except that it may be retained
by the EFT service provider to the extent, and for the limited period of time,
customer's account to other government agencies.
Id.
What is particularly disturbing about government operation of ACHs is that the surveil-
lance potential of EFT systems discussed above is relatively minor in comparison to the
threat posed by the Federal Reserve System's operation of ACHs. The Commission said of
this:
Current problems with government access to bank records are relatively minor com-
pared with the potential threat to privacy posed by government operation of EFT
facilities. As such services become more sophisticated and documentation and surveil-
lance capacity increases, government operation of EFT systems will become, in the
Commission's view, an unparalleled threat to personal privacy.
Id.
Because of this very real threat to personal privacy, the Commission recommended: "That
no governmental entity be allowed to own, operate, or otherwise manage any part of an
electronic payments mechanism that involves transactions among private parties." Id. at 123.
Adoption of this recommendation would help to lessen the possibility that there will be a
conflict of interest on the part of the Federal Reserve System with it becoming less responsive
to the public. Id. If this recommendation is not acted on, it is possible that there may not be
any choice in the future. The economic cost of providing a non-governmental ACH system
may become too great to permit that. Id. Another factor to be considered is the possibility
that the EFT systems run by banks (or at least the variety known as point-of-sale terminals)
may merge with the ACHs, thus posing an even greater threat to personal privacy. Id.
145. Id. at 120.
146. Id. at 120-21. For a discussion of automated clearinghouse services, see note 144
supra.
147. Id. at 121.
148. Id. at 122.
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that such information is essential to fulfill the operations requirements of the
service provider." '
The reason for this recommendation is to limit access to personal
information to the parties involved so that they can control who
receives personal information about them.'50 The recommendation
also helps to guard against misuse of personal information by the
service provider.
The recommendation does not include a suggested enforcement
mechanism. Without it, implementation may prove ineffective. If
Congress adopts this suggestion, it should provide for the imposition
of substantial fines against violaters of it.
C. Inaccurate Information
Another problem likely to occur is the retention and dissemina-
tion of inaccurate information. Anyone who has ever been the victim
of an error in a charge account, a telephone or electric bill or of some
other computer generated error knows that it is usually a lot easier
to get the erroneous information into than out of the system. This
is true despite the protection that the Fair Credit Billing Act affords
credit card users.' At present, EFT users have no such protection,
but as EFT systems become more common and expand, it will prob-
ably be needed.'52 To alleviate this potential problem, the Commis-
sion recommended: "That procedures be established so that an in-
dividual can promptly correct inaccuracies in transactions or ac-
count records generated by an EFT service."' 53
There is one recommendation the Commission made with respect
to bank reports to check guarantee services that should be adopted
with respect to EFT systems as well. The Commission suggested
that when the bank discovers it has incorrectly reported informa-
tion, it should be required to notify the check cashing service of the
correct information in a reasonable period of time so that the receiv-
ing party's records can be corrected.'54 Considering the speed with
which computer systems can provide information, an EFT provider
should also be required to notify any person or organization to whom
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 127.
152. Id. at 112.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 128.
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it has released the erroneous information of the correct information
promptly. When a dispute occurs between the EFT provider and the
customer, the customer should have an opportunity to provide EFT
users with an explanation of the disagreement. This could be ac-
complished by allowing the customer to file a written explanation
with the service provider, which would then be forwarded to the
information receiver, if information is lawfully disclosed before the
disagreement is resolved. This will enable the receiver to better
evaluate the information provided.
Congress might also wish to consider legislation granting individ-
uals the right to sue the provider of EFT services for release of
personal information without the individual's authorization. The
prospect of paying substantial damages for abuse of personal pri-
vacy should act as a strong deterrent against the unauthorized re-
lease of personal information. Additionally, criminal sanctions
might be imposed for the willful or repeated negligent release of
personal information. If civil and criminal penalties are not im-
posed, some other effective way must be found to protect the indi-
vidual's right to personal privacy if "1984" is not to arrive several
years in advance of its scheduled date.
IV. Conclusion
If the use of EFT systems is further encouraged by changes in the
banking law of the United States, the problem of abuse of an indi-
vidual's right to privacy will increase dramatically. Few states have
attempted to deal with the privacy problems inherent in EFT sys-
tems which they have authorized their own state financial institu-
tions to use, nor has the federal government acted effectively in this
area.
The potential that EFT systems and especially Automatic Clear-
ing Houses have for virtually destroying the individual's privacy is
very disturbing. Obviously, it is not possible to prevent the use of
modern technology, nor is it desirable to do so. However, care should
be used when utilizing electronic technology. Only if the'concern for
the rights of the individual is as strong as the desire to benefit from
technology can we be reasonably certain that the price the individ-
ual pays for increased technological ability is not too high. The only
effective way to reflect concern for the personal privacy of individu-
als is to control strictly the uses to which data in computer systems
can be put. Such controls will enable banks and other businesses to
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benefit from modern technology without jeopardizing the individ-
ual's right to privacy. Therefore, it is essential that Congress act
quickly to implement the recommendations of the Commission.
Under present law, it is clear that EFT systems cannot be used
in states which prohibit "branching." Yet, for businesses, including
banks, to function effectively, they must be able to take advantage
of modem technology. Refusing to allow this could hurt American
businesses competitively in relation to foreign businesses. However,
allowing federal banks to use EFT systems even if state banks could
not would go a long way towards destroying the carefully nurtured
system of "competitive equality."
In the final analysis, whether the definition of branch banking is
rewritten to allow the use of EFT systems is a matter of policy for
Congress to decide. It should allow the use of EFT systems, but
should also immediately place safeguards on the use of the data in
those systems. Effective action to protect the privacy of individuals
is essential.
Janine P. Hornicek
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